Vulnerable Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea

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Abstract: This research scrutinizes the process of democratic consolidation in South Korea, focusing on interactions of political actors. This study assumes that if democratization depends on political interactions, the status of the outcomes tends to be fluctuating, and examines the research hypothesis that democratic transition of South Korea was the outcomes of strategic interactions between political actors, by analyzing the political conjuncture of presidential nomination in 1992 as a crucial moment of democratic transition in South Korea, with a rational choice theory: a game theory model. The results show that strategic interaction of political actors determined the process of transitions, even after the founding election. This research also clarifies that the weakness of the political society and severe regionalism, which are derived from patrimonialism, are the vital elements for fluctuating consolidation in South Korea. Keywords: Democratization, Democratic Consolidation, Rational Choice Theory

1. Introduction

A word “vulnerable” and “consolidation” contradict with each other. If democracy of a state has been consolidated, the society must be stable. If a state is vulnerable, its democracy hasn’t been consolidated yet. It is quite common to admit that South Korea has completed democratic consolidation now. In South Korea, we can witness that 1) the government is changed through elections, 2) the majority party of the National Assembly is alternately replaced, 3) there is an active civil society, 4) civil liberties and rights are guaranteed, 5) the judiciary is independent. South Korea ranked at 23 out of 167 countries in the 2019 democracy index of the Economic Intelligent Unit. Although South Korea is classified as flawed democracies, due to the relatively low political participation of people, South Korea’s rank is higher than Japan and the U.S. which are perceived as a good example of full democracy, even higher than Italy, Greece (Economic Intelligent Unit, n.d.). According to the World Bank, Korea’s nominal GDP reached 1.619$ trillion in 2018, ranking 12th among 205 countries worldwide (World Bank, n.d.). Statistically, we are able to admit Korea have achieved both political and economic development. Reality seems not to be far different from the results shown in statistics, at least in the author’s opinion. Many scholars may try to investigate the correlations between politics and economics or causality, asking themselves which factors mostly effective, but they may not be interested in its stability. Therefore, they may not be able to understand the political scandal that ended with president Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and arrest in 2017. This series of processes includes manipulation of state affairs, bribery, extortion, and even a self-coup plan with proclaiming martial law by the military. If the achievement of modernization or economic development have a causality with political development, which can be presented by consolidated democracy, South Korea would not have experienced the political scandal in 2014.

For this reason, this research will scrutinize the process of democratic consolidation in South Korea, focusing on interactions of political actors. Before the examination, it is necessary to assume one proposition, that is, if democratic transition and consolidation are fully dependent on political interactions, the status of outcomes tends to be fluctuating. It means that it is an endless process between being strengthened and weakened by interactions of political actors. This research frames a hypothesis, which is that contingent political interactions with actors’ strategy and choice determine democratic transition, that is, democratic transitions of South Korea was the outcomes of strategic interactions
between political actors. and examine the democratic transition period of South Korea, by which build a foundation of consolidated democracy: from 1987 to 1993. The period represents the onset of the political transitions: liberalization and democratization. Firstly, this research will review the democratization theory, focusing on actor-based approaches, the trajectories of democratization in South Korea, and crucial moment of strategic interactions between political actors with contingent factors. This examination aims to answer the questions: 1) How did democratization take place in South Korea?, 2) How and why did South Korea's democratization succeed?, 3) What strategies and choices did political actors interact with?, 4) What contingent factors intervene in political interactions?, 5) What defects in Korea make the consolidated system vulnerable?

This research will examine that contingent political interactions with actors’ strategy and choice determine democratic transition and verified its validity with the rational choice model, the game theory, by analyzing the crucial moment of democratization in South Korea. The study will use the narrow and procedural concepts of democracy proposed by Schumpeter (1947) and Dahl (1971): the political system must guarantee citizens a high level of civil liberties and rights, free and fair elections, and invest citizen with opportunities for participation and competition.

As for rational choice model, it is related with decision-making situations. This analytic model is based on two assumptions: 1) methodological individualism, which insists that people’s preference and choice can be the key to understand social processes and outcomes, and 2) purposeful action, which means that people’s behaviors are purposeful to attain a goal, and implies that we can consider someone’s decision is the result of the calculation including perceptions, values, and beliefs (Ordeshook, 1986, pp. 3-1).

Przeworski and O’donnell introduced rational choice theory to an academic field of democratization, and developed their strategy choice model, focused on strategies for shaping context of decision-making, which actors chase goals by shaping the context in which others make choices. They assumed that actors make choice in terms of an assessment of cost and benefit. There are two essential components: 1) Choice, which is influenced by the context and by changes in context, and is varied by discretion of actor in the end, and 2) Strategy, which is calculations of act adopted to increase likelihood of achieving a goal, such as reform or democracy. Political outcomes originated from the interaction among different actors’ strategic choices. Choices and strategies can only be valid if results are not known and predetermined and if decisions are not so firmly constrained as to eliminate discretion: That component is uncertainty, which means not knowing exactly what choices other actors are likely to make (Collier & Norden, 1992, pp. 230-229).

This research consists of five chapters: 1) Preface, 2) Theory of Democratization, 3) History of Democratization in South Korea, 4) Strategic Interactions of Crucial Moment of Transitions, 5) Negative Elements of Consolidation, 6) Conclusion.

2. Theory of Democratization
2.1. Democracy

Democracy is a kind of political system and a form of government for regulating relations between rulers and the ruled. The modern definition of democracy was based on the studies of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert A Dahl. Joseph Schumpeter described democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." (Schumpeter, 1943, p. 269) Dahl viewed a term 'Democracy' as an ideal type and instead, presented the concept of Polyarchy, procedural democratic political system of reality, emphasizing on participation and contestation (Dahl, 1971, pp. 3-1).

2.2. Democratization

Democratization can be defined, in the works of O'Donnell & Schmitter, as “the process of change into a political system that aims for the ideology and goals of democracy”. The process of democratization can be analytically divided into three phases: 1) Political liberalization, 2) Democratic transition 3) Consolidation. Political liberalization is the process of establishing effective and definite rights to protect social groups and individuals from illegal behaviors, but it is mostly limited opening under the authoritarian rules. Democratization is a stage from the dismantlement of authoritarian rules to the establishment of a democratic government through free and fair elections with full citizenship rights (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pp. 11-6).

There are two approaches to study democratization: structural and procedural. A structural approach is that democracy, which is considered as a form of political development, requires a certain level of socio-economic and cultural prerequisites. Lipset argues that wealth and education are positively related to development of democracy, with a sentence "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” Economic growth creates favorable conditions for democracy through wealth, industrialization, urbanization, education, and the growth of the middle class which mitigates socio-political flaws and weighs moderate political trends (Lipset, 1959, pp. 83-71). This research will use a procedural approach. It is to study the choices and strategies of micro-political actors, to assume that democracy is not a dependent variable of macro-socio-economic conditions, but a dependent variable of strategic interactions between political actors. Political actors are involved in the game by calculating the cost and benefit of the act, considering the choices of other actors. In transition phase to democracy, strategic interactions between the political actors are the most vital for transition. And therefore, the scholars research the procedure of political change with the choices and strategies of micro-political actors, who are behaviorally constrained by macro-structural factors. That is, agencies, who have a capability to do political behavior, interact strategically each other by making a choice in a contingency situation, and the structures only function as structure of choice. However, the theory of political actors basically assumes the possibility of human behavior to overcome structural constraints, and voluntarism is a key feature of it.
Przeworski’s notion of democracy helps us to understand the dynamics of transitions with actors. He argued that democracy must be a spontaneous self-enforcing equilibrium of the strategic interactions between political actors through bargain and compliance with the outcomes. Actor choose the best when they know what others do. Thus, the outcomes are self-enforcing by independent spontaneous reaction, they do not want act differently. As a norm, equilibria and bargains are the only feasible according to game theory. The theory proclaims that all outcomes maintains only because they are enforced mutually in self-interest or by others. And self-interested strategic compliance is sufficient to democratic theory. Cooperation can be voluntarily enforced in systems with punishments by decentralized decision with self-interested (Przeworski, 1991, pp. 24-19).

Przeworski elaborated the democratization theory by interpreting the actor based rational choice theory with the game theory. In the games of transition, two elite groups among 4 groups (hard-liners, soft-liners, moderates, radicals) initiate the process, 1) Reformers, soft-liners in the authoritarian power bloc who seek leverage over hard-liners, their counterparts, 2) Moderates. And these elites act strategically. Przeworski asserted that the first sign of transitions is the opening-up of the political system with civil rights for the people. It is a decision of the regime to tolerate a civil autonomous organization. The civil society groups have been organized and mobilized with authoritarian regime’s open. The goal of opening by the regime is not democratization, but rather to broaden its base of public support, broaden dictatorship. Liberalization is an outcome of an interaction between splits of the regime and the oppositions (Przeworski, 1991, pp. 62-51). Przeworski claimed that democracy is the contingent consequence of conflicts that hinges on actors' resources, not their values (Przeworski, 1988, pp. 80-58). Democratization is a process which consists of strategic conjunctures. The strategic conjuncture is characterized by the existence of political forces with conflicting interests and their previous actions or by external conditions. For him, transitions are understood as a transition of the political conjuncture that appears as a result of strategic interaction by political actors.

3. History of Democratization in South Korea
3.1. Before the Democratization
After WW2 ended in 1945, Korea was divided into South Korea and North Korea, by being stained of the United States (US) in South Korea and the Soviet Union (USSR) in North Korea. It led to trusteeship rule for 3 years respectively in South Korea and North Korea. South Korea’s first democratic election was held under the UN’s supervision for 198 members of the National Assembly in May 1948 and for the president in July 1948. On August 1948, South Korea was launched as a name of the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the first president Rhee Syngman. The tension between the US and the USSR led to the outbreak of the Korean War between South Korea and North Korea in 1950. The war was over after 3 years. The first president Rhee Syngman stepped down and sought asylum in Hawaii with his wife in 1960. But, a group of young army officers headed by General Park Chung-hee carried out military coup and intervened in politics in 16 May, 1961 (Han, 1989, p. 271). Park Chung-hee was assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency on 26 October 1979. Then, a new group of army officers headed by General Chun Doo-hwan carried out the 12 December military coup again. He suppressed the May 18 Democratic Uprising in Gwangju by force and continued the military authoritarian regime in South Korea.
3.2. The June Struggle for Democracy and the June 29 Declaration

The June struggle for democracy began with a contingent event, disclosure of torture resulting in death. It was discovered the fact that Park Jong-cheol, a student at Seoul University, was tortured to death during police interrogation on January 1987. This incident was reported in the newspaper with a title of the shock of a college student's death. Civil groups and opposition parties held a memorial service and organized street marches. On June 26, the "Great Peaceful March of the People for a Democratic Constitution" was held in 33 cities and 4 provinces with the participation of 1.5 million people, and in Seoul, 250,000 citizens participated in 67 places (Seo, 2007, p. 284). When police arrested protesters by force and the peace march became violent in some places, therefore, police forces were not enough to suppress the protest, Roh Tae-woo, the presidential candidate of the ruling party, announced a plan to resolve the current situation on June 29. This June 29 announcement consists of eight clauses: 1) Implementation of the presidential elections after amending the constitution for direct elections, according to an agreement between the ruling party and the opposition party, 2) Amendment of the presidential election law, 3) Pardon, return of Kim Dae-jung, and political prisoners' release, 4) Strengthening of human and civil rights, 5) Promotion of freedom of the press by revising the Basic Press Law, 6) Implementation of a local self-government system and the educational autonomy as soon as possible, 7) Guarantee of activities for political parties, 8) Achievement of substantial social reform (Ahn, 2007, pp. 278-278).

3.3. New Democratic Regime as an Extension of Military Authoritarianism

The presidential election, as a founding election, was held on December 1987 under the new constitution, which amended by agreements between the old regime and the oppositions. The democratic opposition group failed to take power through the relatively free and fair elections, because of the mutual defection of the opposition candidates between Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, by failing a single candidacy agreement. The social movement groups for democracy were divided over which candidate to support. In results, Roh Tae-woo won the presidential election, receiving 8.28 million votes (%36.6). The turnout in the elections was %89.2. Kim Young-sam won 6.33 million votes (%28.0), and Kim Dae-jung received 6.11 million (%27.1) (Seo, 2007, pp.302-299). In the presidential election in December 1987, the successor to the former military regime won, but in the 13th National Assembly election in April 1988, the three opposition parties became a majority in Parliament. This contingent results significantly changed the political landscape. It was the first experience of a divided government in in Korean parliamentary history. Opposition parties formed a united front in Parliament, and held parliamentary hearings on issues of the Gwangju democratic struggle in 1980 and political corruption committed under the former military regime. This contingent change pushed Roh Tae-woo into a political reorganization in order to reverse the balance of power in Parliament. Therefore, president Roh Tae-woo established a new big party, the Democratic Liberal Party, by merging of Roh Tae-woo's the Democratic Justice Party (the ruling party), Kim Young Sam’s the Reunification Democratic Party (the second opposition party) and Kim Jong-pil’s the New Democratic Republican Party (the third opposition party) in February 1990. The new grand conservative coalition captured two-thirds of the legislative seats by this merger. The first opposition party, the Democratic and Peace Party defined the merger is a coup under the guise of law and claimed the merger was an attempt to prolong their rule (Lee, 1990). This conservative coalition obstructed the process of democratization and the Democratic
and Peace Party was isolated Kim Dae-jung’s feature is relatively progressive, in February 1990. This conservative coalition obstructed the process of democratization and marginalized Kim Dae-jung’s the Peace Democratic Party which is relatively progressive (Lee, 2010, pp. 148-147).

3.4. The Civilian Regime and Reform Policies
Kim Young-sam, a former dissident leader, was nominated for the presidential election of the ruling party, and won the election on December 1992, 18. Kim Young-sam’s principle of state affairs was "change" and "reform", and the detailed tasks were 1) reforming political process, 2) improving the quality of democracy, 3) eradicating the past authoritarian legacy. Accordingly, Kim Young-Sam materially planned to establish civilian control over the military and to eradicate corruption first (Park, 2006, p. 141). Once Kim Young-sam assumed the presidency in February 1993, he immediately implemented democratic political reform. Because his background was the grand conservative coalition, Kim had a capability of political reform. Firstly, Kim Young-sam tried to ensure civilian control over the military by purging the members of the Hanahoe, a secret and illegal faction within the army, in a way that forced them to retire or prevented them from promoting. Former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo are the core of the faction Hanahoe, which stems from secret praetorian guards for the first military dictator Park Chung-hee and monopolized power in the military. Kim Young-sam’s military reform was successful because of not only its blitzkrieg manner but also his conservative credentials and robust anti-communism. Secondly, Kim Young-sam enacted the “real-name bank account” law. Bank accounts under pseudonyms was the source of corruption, that is, political slush funds, which connects politicians and businessmen (Chaibong, 2008, p. 135). In late 1995, two former presidents, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, were prosecuted for allegations of December 12 military coup in 1987, the May 18 Gwangju massacre in 1980, and creation of illegal slush funds. In April 1997, the Supreme Court confirmed the original life sentences to Chun Doo-hwan and 17 years in prison to Roh Tae-woo. Later, at the request of Kim Dae-jung as a winner of the new presidential election, the government granted amnesty for Chun and Roh and released them on December 1997, 22 (Seo, 2007, pp. 326-324, Lee, 2020, pp. 151-150).

3.5. The First Peaceful Turnover to Opposition
With the beginning of the Kim Dae-jung government in February 1997, the democratic shift was completed in South Korea. It was the first regime change to the opposition in a peaceful and democratic way in Korean political history. This period is evaluated both formally and qualitatively as the beginning of consolidation of democracy in South Korea. In this period, civil society organizations were boosted, but conflicts between conservatives and progressives and regionalism worsened. The Kim Dae-jung regime had a similar political system to the previous government, but the members of ruling power were slightly different. The Kim Young-sam regime was formed by the coalition of military, bureaucracy, and Young-Nam region, where all previous military dictators came from. That was the limit of the Kim Young-sam regime, considering it was a civilian government. Meanwhile, the Kim Dae-jung regime was based on the marginalized area, Ho-Nam, and was so-called representative of the poor. In that reason, the regime showed weakness in exerting its power, due to political struggle with the opponents who lost state power. In addition, because of the policy of reconciling with North Korea, the ideological conflicts with conservative bloc was severe in that time (Kim, 2006, pp. 353-350).
4. Strategic Interactions of Crucial Moment of Transitions

This chapter will examine how the former dissident, Kim Young-sam, was able to be chosen for the presidential candidate of the conservative ruling party, with a rational choice model, a game theory. It is quite reasonable to consider that the political conjecture of 2012 presidential nomination was the crucial moment in the process of democratic transitions in South Korea after the June movement 1987, by providing an opportunity of civilian control over military for Kim Young-sam in the future. This research will use the notion of Przeworski and payoff table, which consist of actor, strategy, and pay-off. And this research assumes that, 1) the actor is rational, 2) the actor makes choice in terms of an assessment of cost and benefit, 3) the actor considers the other actor’s choice and likelihood of choice 4) based on the arbitrary perception, the actor tries to maximize the interests or averse the risk.

4.1. Crucial Moment of Transitions

The new president Roh Tae-woo had an ambivalent attitude for democracy. He wanted to be evaluated as a pathfinder of democratic road in South Korea, meanwhile, he must protect the benefits and privileges of the members of old regime: Military. Hence, he implemented a suppressive policy against anti-communist or radicals since 1989, but he tried to maintain the quality of procedural democracy at a minimal degree. In the face of contingent outcomes, a divided government due to defeat of parliamentary election in 1988, Roh Tae-woo counter-attacked with merging his party with two other parties and formed the majority in the parliament. It was an effect and efficient counter-attack from the old forces. The Roh Tae-Woo administration abandoned the unilateral mode of oppression and chose a mode of selective inclusion with selective oppression (Cho, 2001, p. 301). Because the criterion between inclusion and exclusion was set in accordance with the ideology and the region, the conservative governing block strengthened their hegemony to majority of society by acquiring the legitimacy of procedural democratization. Roh Tae-woo had completed the absolute formula of victory in the future election and had not consolidated democracy, but the foundation of permanent rules for the conservatives include military. However, Kim Young-sam successfully became the presidential candidate of the ruling conservative party and won the presidential election in 1992. In the first year of his rein, he immediately implemented democratic political reform. Kim Young-sam ensured civilian control over the military by purging the influential members of the illegal faction within the army, in a way that forced them to retire or prevented them from promoting. This democratic measure broke the system that Roh Tae-woo had completed for permanent ruling with the old order, by removing the leverage of power, a coercive measure, and established a fair procedural democracy.
4.2. Basic Information and Operationalization for Analysis

- The actors: Roh Tae-woo, who is the incumbent president in 1992 and Kim Young-sam, who is one of leaders in the Democratic Liberal Party, the ruling grand coalition based on the merger of 3 parties. Kim young-sam is a former dissident leader and he won 28 percent of the vote in the 1987 presidential election.

- The political conjuncture: the process of nomination for 1992 presidential election in the Democratic Liberal Party. The convention for the election of presidential candidates was held on May 1992.

- The possible actions: cooperation or betrayal

- Pay-off as quantified benefits: 4 (the best), 3 (good), 2 (bad), 1 (the worst)

Because Roh Tae-woo has privileges in the party as a leader, he may be satisfied in present benefits. Thus, it can be evaluated as 3 (good). Meanwhile, Kim-young-sam has relatively marginalized as a former dissident leader in the party, so his present benefits can be evaluated as 2 (bad).

- A contingent event before the nomination: Roh Tae-woo regime has two intelligence organizations: The Defense Security Command and the Agency for National Security Planning. On October 1990, it was revealed that the Defense Security Command, the military surveillance unit, carried out illegal inspections of civilians, dissidents, journalists, intellectuals and lawmakers from both the opposition and government. Private Yoon Seok-yang deserted from the security command with taking classified papers, computer discs and other data. The data included personal records of Kim Young-sam and the leader of opposition party Kim Dae-jung. Because Roh Tae-woo has promised to uphold the military’s political neutrality since his inauguration in February 1988, the opposition party protested harshly that it was a military intervention. ("Opponents Demand," 1990)

- Background of conflicts inside the Democratic Liberal Party: it was disclosed a memorandum of agreement, in which Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil signed at the time of the merger to implement amendment the constitution from a presidential system to a cabinet system within 1 year, by the press. It was believed to intend diminishing Kim Young-sam’s power as a presidential candidate by the faction of old regime inside the ruling party. Kim Youn-sam broke away from party affairs, criticizing the purpose of the disclose. Roh Tae-woo tried to make Kin Young-sam back to party affairs, and attempted to smooth conflict over, putting weight on Kim Young-sam (Roh, 2011, pp. 495-494).

4.3. Analysis of Strategic Interactions

After reviewing the background of this political phase, this research finds that the preference of Roh is to maintain the regime and order, because he wanted to guarantee the rest life of him and the military, whereas the preference of Kim Young-sam is to be a president. It manifested in Roh Tae-woo’s words “The purpose of merger was different between me and Kim Young-sam. I aimed at carrying out state affairs smoothly, but Kim Young-sam’s purpose was only achievement of presidency” (Roh, 2011, p. 501). Based on the findings, there are 4 outcomes out of strategic interactions, cooperation and betrayal, between Roh Tae-Woo and Kim Young-sam. Their strategic situation can be shaped as follows.
Table 1: The Pay-off table of Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Betrayal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roh Tae-woo</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>① 4,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Betrayal</td>
<td>② 1,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Young-sam</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>③ 3,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Betrayal</td>
<td>④ 1,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The Outcomes of Strategic Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case ①</th>
<th>Case ②</th>
<th>Case ③</th>
<th>Case ④</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roh</td>
<td>Kim</td>
<td>Roh</td>
<td>Kim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Interaction</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Preference</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>N. A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Values</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated nomination</td>
<td>Kim</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C: Cooperation, B: Betrayal, A: Achieve, N. A: Not Achieve

• Case ①: When Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam both choose cooperation, Kim Young-sam becomes a candidate. Kim Young-sam has the highest possibility of winning the election when he stays in the ruling party. Because he has a background of the grand conservative coalition and a good reputation rooted on democracy movements in the past. Roh Tae-woo will achieve his preference, protecting his privileges with the best possibility, thus his estimated pay-off is 4. Kim Young-sam will achieve his preference, being a president with the best possibility, thus his estimated pay-off is 4.

• Case ②: When Roh chooses cooperation, meanwhile Kim Chooses betrayal, betrayal of Kim Young-sam is to defect the party. Kim Young-sam can’t become a candidate, and the other person do. Roh Tae-woo’s other successor has a low possibility of winning the election when Kim Young-sam is in the opposition party. Because the grand conservative coalition is broken now, the possibility is low. Roh Tae-woo will face lots of risks from the future president Kim Dae-jung by his attempt of control over military and historical readjustment (Kim, 2013, p. 69). This is the worst case for Roh Tae-woo, thus his estimated pay-off is 1. Kim Young-sam has also a low possibility of winning the election. He couldn’t run for election, and only support Kim Dae-jung, because Kim Dae-jung has the best possibility of winning election in this case, thus his estimated pay-off is 1.
• Case ③: When Roh chooses betrayal, meanwhile Kim chooses cooperation, betrayal of Roh Tae-woo is to nominate other person as a candidate inside the party. Kim Young-sam can’t become a candidate, and the other person do. Roh Tae-woo’s other successor has a high possibility of winning the election when Kim Young-sam stays in the ruling party. Because the grand conservative coalition maintained, the possibility is high but the new successor’s popularity must be less than Kim Young-sam. Popularity have an influence to election. Roh Tae-woo will achieve his preference, protecting his privileges, but with a good possibility, not the best, thus his estimated pay-off is 3. He must have a little fear of the future, thus his estimated pay-off is 3. Kim Young-sam will fail his preference, but he may target the next election, waiting in the ruling party, thus his estimated pay-off is 2, the same as the present, or less than the present.

• Case ④: When Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam both chooses betrayal, This case lead to the same outcome with the case ②, because no matter what Roh Tae-woo chooses, if Kim Young-sam choose betrayal, the coalition will be broken, and Kim Dae-jung will have the best possibility of winning election in this case. Kim Young-sam and Roh Tae-woo both will not achieve their preferences, thus both estimated pay-offs are 1.

whatever Roh Tae-woo chooses corporation or betrayal, Kim Young-sam will choose cooperation, because if Kim Young-sam choose cooperation, he would achieve maximum 4, whereas betrayal will give him maximum 1. Whatever Kim Young-sam chooses cooperation or betrayal, Roh Tae-woo will choose cooperation, because, if Roh Tae-woo chooses cooperation, he would achieve maximum 4, whereas betrayal will give him maximum 3. Therefore, no matter what the counterpart chooses, they will choose both cooperation. This is status of Nash Equilibrium; the combination of cooperation is the best outcome for both and nobody does not have motives to change their choice. And their dominant strategies, which gave them the best outcomes are both cooperation either. Furthermore, the Key that induces better outcomes, belongs to Kim Young-sam. No matter what Roh Tae-woo chooses, if Kim Young-sam chooses betrayal, then both achieve 1 as an outcome. Roh Tae-woo is a risk averse person, whereas Kim Young-sam is always willing to take risks to achieve his goal. Roh Tae-woo might consider that Kim Young-sam could take risks by leaving the party. Therefore, Kim Young-sam was able to dominate the game with Roh Tae-woo. When Kim Young-sam enter the ruling party although he is the leader of the second largest opposition party, he said “I go in tiger’s den in order to catch a tiger,” which means “Nothing venture, nothing have.” And he said in his interview in 2009, “The opposition was divided into two parties and fought each other. And because the regionalism was severe, there is nothing to end the military regime, but the merge of parties. After the merger, Roh Taw-woo tried to prevent me from becoming a presidential candidate, but I struggled and finally achieved” (Jung & Park, 2015).

5. Negative Elements of Consolidation
In this chapter, this research will describe what makes South Korean democracy vulnerable, despite that it is already consolidated statistically according to the democratic report of the Economist Intelligence Unit in London. The highly probable elements must be 1) the weak political society, and 2) severe regionalism.
5.1. The Weak Political Society

As Joseph Schumpeter has mentioned, “The first and foremost aim of each political party is to prevail over the others in order to get into power or to stay in it,” the primary goal of parties is to assume power of the state (Schumpeter, 1943, p. 279). However, the parties of South Korea have functioned only to come into the power during the democratic transition period and even consolidation period. Power-seeking of political parties in transition period has some positive factors in order to resist the authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, Korean political parties fiercely competed, and at the same time repeatedly reorganized themselves, facing important elections. The change of the party’s name became a routine that passed through a political crisis. Thus, a life cycle of parties was very short. The long-standing features of the South Korean political parties are, 1) the political elite’s cartel structure to protect the interests without any distinct alternative programs, regardless of popular interests or demands from the below, 2) a cadre party without active participation of people who pay membership fees, 3) A party with a power-opportunistic nature that aims at victory in the election itself rather than the realization of ideology, vision and policy, 4) an inclusive party with an ambiguous identity under the banner of nationalism or pragmatism (Cho, 2007, pp. 55-54). Accordingly, the instability of South Korean democracy would be bound to a low degree of institutionalization of political parties. The political system is vulnerable and shallow-rooted. Also, the organization of parties is fragile and organized around some powerful figures (Croissant, 2015, pp. 4-3).

From the beginning of the authoritarianism in South Korea, the opposition parties organized around two powerful figures, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. Even though their achievements were great and unlikely ever to be equaled, the structure of their parties left a negative legacy, privatizing power and inheriting power which Max Weber defined as premodern patrimonialism. In other words, nepotism, bossism, clientelism. Therefore, the democracy in two-Kim times was a combination between premodern feature and modern democracy: patrimonial democracy. Two Kim had no choice but to do adopt the way that authoritarian dictators maintained the organization in order to preserve the democratization organization under the suppression of the authoritarian regime and to secure the loyalty of their followers. They established a patrimonial party to resist non-democratic dictatorship, and operated their party in a non-democratic and secret way. Accordingly, Democracy of South Korea was an elite-led democracy, which lacks accountability and responsiveness. Two-Kim times is over now, but their negative legacies barely but, still exist in politics of South Korea (Im, 2011, pp. 26-24). As for a role of political party in Korea, interactions between political parties are often deadlocked. And it is very difficult to find a political party based on its own policy and vision. Mostly the parties are just based on regionalism (Sohn, Park, & Lim, 2009, p. 119). Even after the completion of procedural democratization, party politics has not developed well, so, some of civil society organizations play a role as a deputy of political party (Cho, 2001, p. 297, p. 377).

By the way, a short history of the introduction of democracy can be another reason for the weakness of political society in South Korea. The South Korean political system of liberal democracy was implanted by the U.S. after WW2 (Kim, 2006, p. 31). After three years of U.S. military rule, South Korea experienced a catastrophic civil war with North Korea for three years. After the civil war, South Korea had to endure the rule of civilian authoritarianism, experiencing non-democratic political system with a severe cleavage of ideology. And then, South Korea entered the Military regime period with suppressing the
activities of political parties. The party politics of South Korean didn’t work until the year 1985, when the military regime allowed decompression. In the opening phase of 1985, civil society exploded and began to protest outside the political system, on the street, but there was no organization to represent their interests in the political sphere. In the 1985 parliamentary election, the New Korean Democratic Party was formed three weeks ago from the election day. After that, the social movement forces mobilized the votes for the New Korean Democratic Party. The party became the biggest opposition party. This was the first moment that the people’s demand on the street replaced by political party as an institution in South Korea (Im, 2011, p. 66). In results, South Korea has only 35 years of political experience of democracy with political parties, out of 5,000 years of national history.

5.2. Severe Regionalism

Regionalism has been the most influential factor for voting in the election in South Korea since the onset of democratization. The social cleavage is defined by a region in South Korea. Thus, any confrontation, democratic vs. non-democratic or reformer vs. anti-reformer or progressive vs. conservative has not appeared in the elections. Regionalism is a by-product of conservative monopoly in political system (Cho, 2007, p. 56). It is also believed that regionalism is related with patrimonialism of political parties in South Korea. As this research reviewed before, the patrimonial party has a feature of clientelism, which consists of a patron and a client through exclusive benefits. A patron is the leader of the party and the client is the people of the region. On the contrary, the patron received votes from the region and could advance to the main stage of politics (Im, 2011, pp. 26-24). Politicians in the regions that have relatively well benefited from economic growth, justify regionalism, and provoke aggressive regional emotion, then use it in politics. Meanwhile, the people who live in the marginalized region from economic growth have a defensive regional emotion as a defense against aggressive regional emotion. Now politicians use defensive regional emotion in their politics (Cho, 2001, pp. 315-313).

Regionalism began to form in 1987 and was completely solidified by the merger of three parties in 1990, creating %35 unshakable supporters for the previous military regime, who identify themselves as a conservative (Kwak, 2016). Moreover, a lot of urban middle classes that were on the side of anti-dictatorship movements in 1987, became the supporters of conservative party, based on the party of dictatorship, with the merger of three parties. This was a strategy of ruling that psychologically isolates oppositions and makes them objects of hatred. In doing so, it functions as a means of excluding, separating, and ruling them, as well as a means of justifying concentration of power into the elites from their cliental region TK, Taegu city and Kyeongbuk province (Choi, 1993, pp. 325-324). With these stable supports, Park Geun-hye could have been elected, who is the daughter of the strongman Park Chung-hee in 2012. And then, Park Geun-hye’s was impeached and imprisoned in 2017, on charges of manipulation of state affairs, bribery, extortion.
6. Conclusion
The third wave of democracy that began in Portugal in 1974 reached South Korea in 1987. Although South Korea had no experience of autonomous modernization until 1948, and no experience of sound democracy until 1987, South Korea could hold a free, fair and direct presidential election in December 1987. It was the first direct presidential election since the military dictator Park Chung-hee changed the electoral system to the indirect system in 1972. But, as a result, the military successor Roh Tae-woo extended the old military order for five more years, with an electoral legitimacy. Then, he established a strong framework for a permanent rule under the democratic electoral system, by a grand conservative coalition through a merger of three parties. It was a powerful measure by combining with a majority of regionalism. Nevertheless, Kim Young-sam, a former dissident leader, became a candidate of the grand coalition, and was elected to presidency. By using their power base, He secured civilian control over military, and completed procedural democratization. After Kim Young-sam, South Korea accomplished a peaceful turnover of power: to Kim Dae-jung, whose rein is evaluated both formally and qualitatively as the beginning of consolidation of democracy in South Korea. The civil liberty and freedom are fully guaranteed and democratic institutions function well.

What this research finds is that democratic transition is the outcomes of strategic interactions between political actors, and which plays a crucial role even after the founding elections. This research examines the hypothesis that contingent political interactions with actors’ strategy and choice determine democratic transition and verified its validity with the rational choice model: the game theory, by analyzing the crucial moment of democratization in South Korea. Kim Young-sam became the key player who can decide whether he gives the expected benefits to Roh Tae-woo or not. In doing so, he dominated the outcomes of interactions. By turning the situation to his advantage, Kim young-sam drew Roh Tae-woo’s cooperation and by betraying after his election as president, he established civilian control over the military. The results of this study suggested that South Korea overcomes the obstacles of democratic transitions by the results of the strategic interactions between Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam in the crucial moment of transitions.

Let’s go back to the first question of this study. How Park Geun-hye, the daughter of the dictator, could be a president and make a political scandal, although South Korean democracy is consolidated? As we examined and as Przeworski observed, democracy is a contingent outcome of conflicts. Therefore, the status of democracy must be subject to fluctuating development between forward and backward. In that reason, consolidated democracy of South Korea after Kim Young-sam, might fluctuate in its development, due to the weakness of political society, especially its patrimonial political parties, and severe regionalism, related to the clientelism. All the vulnerable elements of South Korean politics derived from the legacy of strategic interactions in transition times. The conservatives settled on the majority of regions, and secured their strong and unshakable supporters: 35% of the people. However, the political dynamics is not fixed by prerequisites, but fluctuating, based on actors’ interactions. That is why Park Geun-hye, the daughter of the dictator, was able to become president. And at the same time, that is why Park Geun-hye was impeached and imprisoned in a peaceful way.
South Korea has a long history of a nation, social cohesion, family centered culture, experience of colony and mandatory rule, establishment of a state in 1940s, and military rule, and so on. As for the politics, South Korea has features such as patrimonialism, regionalism, clientelism, authoritarianism, and controlled democracy. South Korean experience of democratization can be reasonable comparison target to countries which shared these nature and features, in comparative study of democracy, in order to gain an understanding of the political dynamics more clearly.

References